19 November 2023

Embracing the Essence of Scout Law in the USA: A Guiding Light for Character Development




Introduction To Scout Law In USA.

In the heart of the scouting movement in the United States, the Scout Law stands as a beacon of guiding principles, shaping the character and moral compass of countless young individuals. The Scout Law in the USA encapsulates a set of twelve values that scouts pledge to uphold, fostering a community of trust, loyalty, and camaraderie. This article delves into the profound significance of the Scout Law in the USA, exploring each principle that forms the foundation of character development among scouts.


Trustworthy:

At the core of the Scout Law in the USA lies the principle of trustworthiness. A scout, guided by this principle, understands the importance of honesty and integrity. In every interaction and endeavor, a scout endeavors to be trustworthy, creating a foundation of reliability and dependability. The commitment to being trustworthy is not only a pledge but a cornerstone for building strong and resilient individuals within the scouting community in the USA.

Loyal:

Loyalty, a value deeply ingrained in the Scout Law in the USA, emphasizes the importance of steadfastness and commitment. A scout is not only loyal to their scouting group but also to their family and friends. This loyalty creates a sense of unity and belonging, fostering a supportive environment where individuals can thrive and grow together. The Scout Law in the USA thus becomes a roadmap for cultivating enduring relationships and a strong sense of community.

Helpful:

In the spirit of being helpful, scouts in the USA embody the principle of selflessness. A scout is always ready to lend a helping hand, both within the scouting community and the broader society. This commitment to being helpful instills a sense of responsibility and compassion, nurturing individuals who are not only adept in outdoor skills but also conscious contributors to the welfare of others.

Friendly:

Friendship is a cornerstone of the Scout Law in the USA, emphasizing the importance of being approachable and amicable. A scout, guided by this principle, radiates friendliness to all, creating an inclusive and welcoming atmosphere within the scouting community. This camaraderie extends beyond the boundaries of scouting events, fostering a culture where individuals forge lasting friendships that endure through the challenges of life.

Courteous:

Courteousness is a virtue that resonates throughout the Scout Law in the USA, shaping scouts into individuals who are polite and respectful. Whether interacting with peers, leaders, or the broader community, a scout upholds the principle of courtesy, contributing to the creation of a positive and harmonious environment. The Scout Law in the USA, through its emphasis on courtesy, becomes a guide for navigating social interactions with grace and respect.

Kind:

Kindness is a universal language that transcends boundaries, and within the context of the Scout Law in the USA, it takes center stage as a fundamental principle. A scout, guided by kindness, understands the strength that lies in gentleness. This principle encourages acts of kindness not only within the scouting community but also in the wider world, fostering a sense of empathy and compassion that extends far beyond the scout uniform.

Obedient:

Obedience, as outlined in the Scout Law in the USA, reflects a commitment to following rules and laws. A scout understands the importance of adherence to guidelines, be they within the family, school, or the scouting group. This principle instills a sense of discipline and responsibility, shaping scouts into individuals who contribute positively to society by respecting and upholding the established norms.

Cheerful:

Amidst the adventures and challenges that scouting presents, cheerfulness becomes a guiding principle in the Scout Law in the USA. A scout embraces a positive outlook, finding joy in tasks and endeavors, and radiates this enthusiasm to others. This commitment to cheerfulness not only enhances the scouting experience but also serves as a valuable life skill, shaping individuals who approach challenges with resilience and optimism.

Thrifty:

The principle of thriftiness in the Scout Law in the USA emphasizes the value of resourcefulness and financial responsibility. A scout learns to work for what they receive and to save for the future. This principle not only instills practical life skills but also cultivates a mindset of sustainability and mindful consumption, contributing to the development of responsible and conscientious individuals.

Brave:

Courage is a hallmark of the Scout Law in the USA, symbolized by the principle of bravery. A scout, guided by bravery, learns to face challenges and uncertainties with resilience and determination. This principle extends beyond physical courage to include moral courage, shaping scouts into individuals who stand up for what is right and just, even in the face of adversity.

Clean:

The principle of cleanliness within the Scout Law in the USA goes beyond the physical realm, encompassing both the body and mind. A scout understands the importance of maintaining personal hygiene and a clear conscience. This commitment to cleanliness not only fosters a healthy and positive environment within the scouting community but also shapes individuals who value self-care and ethical decision-making.

Reverent:

At the pinnacle of the Scout Law in the USA is the principle of reverence. A scout is reverent toward God, faithful in religious duties, and respectful of the beliefs of others. This principle reflects the inclusive nature of scouting, embracing diversity and fostering an environment where individuals of different faiths coexist harmoniously. The Scout Law in the USA, through its emphasis on reverence, encourages a sense of spiritual awareness and understanding.

Conclusion:

In essence, the Scout Law in the USA is not merely a set of guidelines; it is a roadmap for character development, instilling values that shape individuals into trustworthy, loyal, and compassionate members of society. As scouts embark on their journey guided by these principles, they not only contribute to the vibrancy of the scouting community but also become beacons of positive change in the wider world. The Scout Law in the USA, with its timeless values, stands as a testament to the enduring impact of the scouting movement on the lives of countless individuals.

ALL ABOUT BAILS.


 Kinds of Bail



Broadly speaking there are three categories of bail and they arei]

bail in bailable offences,

ii] bail in non bailable offences,

iii] anticipatory bail,

BAIL IN BAILABLE OFFENCES,

Section 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with provisions of

bail in bailable offences. Under this section, bail is the right of person, who

has been accused for commission of offence, which is bailable in nature. This

provision casts a mandatory duty on police official as well as on the Court to

release the accused on bail if the offence alleged against such person is

bailable in nature. This section further makes it clear that whenever any

person, accused of bailable offence is arrested and applies for bail, then the

police official or the Court, as the case may be, has no other alternative except

to allow such application. This section further makes it clear that if the person

applying for bail, is booked for commission of bailable offence, then neither

the Court nor the police official can refuse to release such person merely

because of non availability of surety. Similarly, it is also the duty of Court as

well as police official to release the accused of bailable offence on his

Personal Bond if such person, inspite of order of surety, fails to furnish surety

within 7 days from such order. While casting such duty on police official as

[3]

well as on Magistrate, law raises presumption in favour of the accused to the

effect that the accused is so indigent and poor that he cannot arrange for a

surety and therefore, after that period he has to be released on his personal

recognizance.

If person failed to comply with the conditions of the bail-bond as

regards the time and place of attendance, the Court may refuse to release him

on bail, when on a subsequent occasion in the same case he appears before

the Court or is brought in custody. Any such refusal shall be without prejudice

to the powers of the Court to call upon any person bound by such bond to pay

the penalty thereof under section 446.

The Hon'ble Bombay High Court held in Stefan Mueller -Vs-

State of Maharashtra in Writ Petition No.2939 of 2009 dated 23/06/2010

in para no.10 that it is well settled position of law that if the offence is

bailable, the accused is entitled to be released on bail and even where he does

not make an application for bail, it is the responsibility of the concerned

police officer, if he has arrested or detained the accused for a bailable offence,

to inform him about his right to be released on bail. Similarly, it is also settled

position of law that where a person accused of bailable offence appears or is

produced before a Magistrate, it is responsibility of such Magistrate to inform

him of his right to be released on bail.

A new section 436-A of Cr.P.C. is introduced in the year 2005, to

solve the problems of under trial. As per the directions of Hon'ble Apex

Court in Cri.Writ Petition No.310/2005 (Hon'ble Justice Kurien Joseph

and Rohinton Nariman JJ) and as per section 436-A of Cr.P.C. a person

who has undergone detention for a period extending half the maximum

detention for a period of imprisonment imposed for a particular offence shall

be released on his/her personal bond with or without sureties.

BAIL IN NON BAILABLE OFFENCE:-

Under section 437 When a person is accused of, or suspected of,

the commission of any non-bailable offence, is arrested or detained without

warrant or appears or is brought before a Court other than the High Court or

Court of Session, he may be released on bail, but such person shall not be so

released,

a] if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been

guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life;

b] if such offence is a cognizable offence and he had been previously

convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or

imprisonment for seven years or more, or he had been previously convicted

on two or more occasions of a non-bailable and cognizable offence

c] He may be released if under the age of sixteen years or is a woman

or is sick or infirm

d] He may be released if it is satisfied that it is just and proper so to

do for any other special reason

[4]

e] Accused person may be required for being identified by witnesses

during investigation is not a sufficient ground for refusing bail if he gives an

undertaking that he shall comply with such directions as may be given by the

Court.

f] If it appears to such officer or Court at any stage of the

investigation, inquiry or trial that there are no reasonable grounds for

believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence, but there

are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, subject to the

provisions of section 446A and pending such inquiry, he be released on bail,

or, at the discretion of such officer or Court on the execution by him of a bond

without sureties.

g] When a person accused or suspected of the commission of an

offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or

more or abatement of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any such offence,

is released on bail under sub-section (1) the Court may impose following

condition which the Court considers necessary in order to ensure that (i)

such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond (ii)

shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused or

of the commission of which he is suspected, or(iii) otherwise in the interests

of justice.

h] An officer or a Court releasing any person on bail under subsection

(1), or sub-section (2), shall record in writing his or its reasons or

special reasons for so doing.

i] Any Court which has released a person on bail under sub-section

(1), or sub-section (2), may, if it considers it necessary so to do, direct that

such person be arrested and commit him to custody.

j] If, in any case triable by a Magistrate, the trial of any nonbailable

offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first

date fixed for taking evidence in the case, such person shall, if he is in

custody during the whole of the said period, be released on bail to the

satisfaction of the Magistrate, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the

Magistrate otherwise directs.

k] If, at any time after the conclusion of the trial of a person accused

of a non-bailable offence and before judgment is delivered the Court is of

opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not

guilty of any such offence, it shall release the accused, if he is in custody, on

the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance to hear

judgment delivered.

At the stage of consideration of bail what the Court is normally required

to consider are;

(1) The nature and seriousness of the accusation

(2) Severity of the offences

(3) Nature of the evidence collected and the character and behavior

of the accused

[5]

(4) Chances of the accused absconding and not being available

during the trial

(5) Possibility of repetition of such crime

(6) Chances of the accused of tampering with the evidence and

witnesses, and

(7) Last but not the least, larger interest of the people and the State.

ANTICIPATORY BAIL

Section 438 of Cr.P.C. deals with anticipatory bail. The

anticipatory bail is nothing but a bail in the event of arrest, when any person

has an apprehension or reason to believe that he may be arrested of an

accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence then he may apply to

High Court or Court of Sessions for direction that in the event of arrest he

shall be released on bail. Therefore, the said powers are exclusively vested

with the Court of Sessions and High Courts. For considering the application

for anticipatory bail the prerequisite condition is that the offence must be nonbailable.

There must be a sufficient reason to believe that the applicant may

be arrested in said accusation. The Sessions Court or the Hon'ble High Court

considering the nature and gravity of accusation, the antecedent of applicant,

the possibility to flee from justice and whether the accusation has been made

with object of injury or humiliating the applicant by having him arrested may

either reject the application or issue an interim order for the grant of

anticipatory bail. When the respective court has not passed any interim order

or has rejected the application then the officer-in-charge of police station has

right to arrest the accused without warrant. The interim order alongwith the

seven days notice must be served to the Public Prosecutor and Superintendent

of Police with a view to give them an opportunity for hearing on the

application. The presence of applicant seeking anticipatory bail shall be

obligatory at the time of final hearing of application and passing final order

by the Court. But the Public Prosecutor must have to apply for the same.

Section 438(2) of Cr.P.C. provides that, the High Court or the

Sessions Court may also impose some conditions while granting the

application. The conditions may be as follows :

a) that the persons shall make himself available for the

interrogation by police officer as and when required;

b) that the person shall not directly or indirectly make

any inducement, threats or promise to any witness;

c) that a person shall not leave India without previous

permission of the Court.

18 November 2023

DYING DECLARATION

 DYING DECLARATION



The Hon’ble Apex Court has held in several cases that there is no bar for basing conviction solely on the Dying Declaration but the same should be tested about the voluntaries and truthfulness.


The Hon’ble Apex Court in P.Mani vs. State of T.N. reported in (2006) 3 SCC 161 has held as

follows:

Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 – Dying Declaration – Must be wholly reliable – In case of

suspicion, the Court should seek corroboration – If evidence shows that statement of deceased is not

wholly true it can be treated only as a piece of evidence but conviction cannot be based solely upon it.

It is further held in the very same decision that,

“Indisputably conviction can be recorded on the basis of the dying declaration alone but

therefore the same must be wholly reliable. In a case where suspicion can be raised as

regards the correctness of the dying declaration, the Court before convicting an accused on

the basis thereof would look for some corroborative evidence. Suspicion, it is trite, is no

substitute for proof. If evidence brought on record suggests that such dying declaration does

not reveal the entire truth, if may be considered only as piece of evidence in which event

conviction may not be considered only as a piece of evidence in which event conviction may

not be rested only on the basis thereof. The question as to whether a dying declaration is of

impeccable character would depend upon several factors; physical and mental condition of the

deceased is one of them.”

A leading and landmark decision rendered by a five-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in

respect of Dying Declaration is Laxman V. State of Maharashtra (2002 SCC (Cri.) 1491) in which the

Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows :

“3. … The situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is

the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements

of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of crossexamination,

the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to

inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however, has

always to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either

tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the

deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the

assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit

mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the

eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the

declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no

certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is

not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of

communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication

is positive and definite. …. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must

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necessarily be made to a Magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a Magistrate

there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or

weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and

circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who

records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind.

Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the

statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon

provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the

doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the

declaration can be established otherwise.

4. …..

5. …. It is indeed a hypertechnical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect

that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of

mind especially when the Magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the

questions he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that the

patient was in a fit state of mind whereafter he recorded the dying declaration. ….”

In a recent decision in Amol Singh V. State of M.P. (2002 (5) SCC 468 that Hon’ble Apex Court

has held as follows:

“S.32(1) of the Evidence Act, 1872 – Dying Declaration – Evidentiary value – Multiple dying
declarations – Inconsistencies – Discrepancies in the last dying declaration making it doubtful

– Held, it would not be safe to convict the appellant – Penal Code, 1860, Ss.302 and 34.

Law relating to appreciation of evidence in the form of more than one dying

declaration is well settled. Accordingly, it is not the plurality of the dying declarations but the

reliability thereof that adds weight to the prosecution case. If a dying declaration is found to

be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any

corroboration. The statement should be consistent throughout. If there are more than one

dying declaration they should be consistent. However, if some inconsistencies are noticed

between one dying declaration and the other, the court has to examine the nature of the

inconsistencies, in such a situation, the court has to examine the same in the light of the

various surrounding facts and circumstances.

On facts, it would be unsafe to convict the appellant. The discrepancies make the last

declaration doubtful. The nature of the inconsistencies is such that they are certainly

material. The High Court had itself observed that the dying declaration (Ex.t.P-11) scribed by

the Executive Magistrate (PW 9) at about 0435 hours in the same night was not in conformity

with the FIR and the earlier dying declaration (Ext.P-3) scribed by ASI, B (PW 8) insofar as

different motives have been described. That is not only variation. There are several other

discrepancies, even as regards the manner in which she is supposed to have been sprinkled

with kerosene and thereafter set fire on her.”

Section 32 – Dying Declaration – Recorded in translated version – Reliability – Declaration made by

deceased in Telugu – translated by the duty doctor in Tamil and recorded by the Magistrate in Tamil –

21

Statement so recorded was read over and explained by doctor to deceased – Deceased admitted it to be

correct – As regards translation none was cross examined – No material to show that it was a result of

tutoring – Declaration corroborated by evidence of sister-in-law of deceased – is trustworthy and credible –

Ravi Kumar alias Kutti ravi vs. State of Tamil Nadu - 2006 AIR SCW 1037.

Section 32 – Dying Declaration – Contradiction with accident register – Declaration stating that

accused put deceased on fire – Case of suicide, however, recorded in accident register – Doctor who made

entry, however, explained that entry was so made on presumption since cause of injuries was not informed

to him at that time – Evidence of doctor clear and unambiguous – Defence case of suicide cannot be

accepted on face of two dying declarations recorded by Magistrate and Police Constable and their clear

evidence – Ravi Kumar alias Kutti ravi vs. State of tamil Nadu - 2006 AIR SCW 1037.

Section 32 – Dying Declaration – Deceased wife not keeping good relations with accused-husband –

was labouring under belief that husband was having an affair – Deceased was suffering from depression –

Had made an earlier attempt for suicide – All prosecution witnesses stating that deceased bolted doors of

room from inside – Witnesses along with accused had forced open room and doused fire – Accused

himself had taken her to hospital – Circumstances brought on record clearly point out that what might have

been stated in dying declaration may not be correct – Conviction based only on dying declaration is not

proper –P. Mani vs. State of Tamil Nadu - 2006 AIR SCW 1053.

Section 32 – Dying Declaration – Deceased was assaulted by accused with sword, axe etc. –

Presence or non presence of eye-witness or non-mentioning of name of said eye-witness in dying

declaration – Has no connection with ascertainment of veracity and creditworthiness of dying declaration –

Thus disbelieving dying declaration of deceased recorded by doctor on ground that deceased did not

mention presence of eye-witness in dying declaration – Not proper – Heeralal Yadav vs. State of M.P. -

2006 AIR SCW 3425.

Section 32 – Dying declaration – Recording of – Only because a dying declaration was not recorded

by a Magistrate – Same by itself may not be a ground to disbelieve entire prosecution case –Balbir Singh

vs. State of Punjab - 2006 AIR SCW 4950 (A).

Section 32 – Dying Declaration – Death by burning – victim in her dying declaration recorded by

doctor stating that her husband had put kerosene oil upon her and upon igniting, locked door of bathroom

from outside – Victim in second dying declaration before investigating Officer not only named her husband

but also her mother-in-law – Evidence of witnesses stating how deceased received maltreatment at hands

of accused persons for their demand of dowry – Conviction of accused husband under section 302, proper

– In view of inconsistencies between two dying declarations, benefit of doubt given to accused mother-inlaw

– Conviction of both under section 498-A, proper – Balbir Singh vs. State of Punjab - 2006 AIR SCW

4950 (B).

Section 32 – Dying declaration – Reliability – possibility of deceased becoming instantaneously

unconscious – Expressed by doctor conducting post mortem – No ground to disbelieve dying declaration –

There is a difference between something possible and something possible or certain – Moreso, when dying

declaration was recorded before deceased reached hospital – Gangaram Shantaram Salunkhe vs. State

of Maharashtra - 2006 AIR SCW 5918 (A).

Confession

 What is Confession ?



A ‘‘Confession’’ must either be an express acknowledgement of guilt of the offence charged,

certain and complete in itself, or it must admit substantially all the facts which constitute the offence.

In Sahib singh vs. State of Haryana (AIR 1997 SC 3247) the Hon’ble Apex Court has held thus,

“42. Section 24 provides, though in the negative form, that ‘Confession’ can be treated as relevant

against the person making the confession unless it appears to the Court that it is rendered irrelevant on

account of any of the factors, namely, threat, inducements, promises etc. mentioned therein. Whether the

‘Confession’ attracts the frown of Section 24 has to be considered from the point of view of the confession

of the accused as to how the inducement, threat or promise from a person in authority would operate in his

mind. (See Satbir Singh V. State of Punjab (1977 (2) SCC 263)). “Confession has to be affirmatively

proved to be free and voluntary. (See Hem Rah Devilal v. State of Ajmer (AIR 1954 SC 462)). Before a

conviction can be based on “confession”, it has to be shown that it was truthful.

43. Section 25 which provides that a Confession made to a Police Officer shall not be proved

against the person accused of an offence, places complete ban on the making of such confession by that

person whether he is in custody or not. Section 26 lays down that confession made by a person while he is

in custody of a Police Officer shall not be proved against him unless it is made in the immediate presence

of a Magistrate. Section 27 provides that when any fact is discovered in consequence of information

received from a person accused of any offence who is in the custody of a Police Officer, so much of such

information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates to the fact thereby discovered, may be

proved. Section 27 is thus in the form of a proviso to Sections 24, 25 and 26. Section 164, 281 463 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure are the other provisions dealing with confession and the manner in which it is

to be recorded.”

(b). General Corroboration:-

In Madi Ganga vs. State of Orissa (AIR 1981 SC 1165) the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that,

“6. .... It is now well settled that in order to sustain a conviction on the basis of a confessional

statement it is sufficient that the general trend of the confession is substantiated by some

evidence which would tally with the contents of the confession. General corroboration is sufficient

vide Subramania Goundan V. State of Madras (AIR 1958 SC 66). ....”

(c). Incriminating fact without establishing the guilt:-

Admission – Incriminating fact without establishing the guilt of the maker is not a confession –

Kanda Padayachi vs. State of Tamil Nadu – AIR 1972 SC 66.

9

(d). Inculpatory and exculpatory portion of the Confession:-

Confession – Appreciation of – Acceptance of inculpatory portion while ignoring the improbable

exculpatory portion - Conviction on the basis of confession, affirmed vide Nishi Kant Jha vs. State of

Bihar (AIR 1969 SC 422), in which the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that ,

“The exculpatory part of the appellant’s statement was not only inherently improbable but was

contradicted by the other evidence and also it was wholly unacceptable. The other incriminating

circumstances considered along with the appellant’s statement pointed conclusively to his having

committed the murder. The court could reject the exculpatory portion of the statement and accept

inculpatory portion.”

In Devku Bhikha vs. State of Gujarat – 1995 AIR SC 2171 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that,

“3. It is settled law that the confession of the accused has to be taken as a whole and the

exculpatory part cannot be thrown aside.”

(e). Co- accused:-

Confession – Co-accused – Confession of co-accused can be taken into consideration but it is not

substantive piece of evidence – Ram Chandra vs. State of U.P. (AIR 1957 SC 381).

Confession of co-accused cannot be treated as substantive evidence vide Bishnu Prasad Sinha V.

State of Assam (2007 (11) SCC 467), in which the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that,

“The expression “the court may take into consideration such confession” is significant. It

signifies that such confession by the maker as against the co-accused himself should be treated as

a piece of corroborative evidence. In the absence of any substantive evidence, no judgment of

conviction can be recorded only on the basis of confession of a co-accused, be it extra-judicial

confession or a judicial confession and least of all on the basis of retracted confession.”

(f). Co- accused and Corroboration:-

Confession – Corroboration – Co-accused – Joint trial of more than one accused – The

confession is not irrelevant against co-accused but it is a matter of practice that it is not ordinarily acted

upon without corroboration – Ram Prakash vs. State of Punjab – AIR 1959 SC 1.

Each and every piece of information mentioned in confession need not be corroborated

by independent evidence.

Vilayuda Pulavar vs State 2009(14) SCC 436

WHAT IS INQUEST REPORT ?

 INQUEST REPORT



 Scope and Object :-

The Inquest report is merely to ascertain whether a person has died under suspicious circumstances

or unnatural death, and if so what is the apparent cause of the death. Details of the attack of the deceased

are not necessary to be mentioned. – State of U.P vs. Abdul (AIR 1997 SC 2512).

The scope and object of the inquest report has been elaborately discussed recently in the case of

Radha Mohan Singh vs. State of U.P – (2006) 2 SCC 450 as follows

“It is limited in scope and is confined to ascertainment of apparent cause of death – It is

concerned with discovering whether in a given case the death was accidental, suicidal or

homicidal or caused by animal, and in what manner or by what weapon or instrument the

injuries on the body appear to have been inflicted – Details of overt acts need not be recorded

in inquest report – question regarding details as to how the deceased was assaulted or wno

assaulted him or under what circumstances he was assaulted or who were the witness of the

assault is foreign to the ambit and scope of the proceedings under section 174 – No

requirement in law to mention details of FIR names of the accused or the names of

eyewitnesses or the gist of their statements in inquest report, nor is the said report required to

be signed by any eyewitness.”

The purpose and object of inquest report and Section 172 of Cr.P.C. has been stated as follows –

Section 174 read with 178 of Cr.P.C. – Inquest report is prepared by the Investigating Officer to findout

prima-facie the nature of injuries and the possible weapons used in causing those injuries as also the

possible cause of death – Non-disclosure of name of assailants by eye-witnesses – Merely on this ground

eye-witnesses cannot be disbelieved – Suresh Rai vs. State of Bihar (AIR 2000 SC 2207).

In State Rep. by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu V. Rajendran & Ors. reported in 2008 (8)

Supreme 188, it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that,

"As rightly submitted, the inquest report need not contain the names of all the witnesses".

The inquest report is prepared for the purposes mentioned in section 174, CrPC and not

for corroborating the prosecution case.

Satbir Singh Vs State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 2163

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EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF STATEMENTS RECORDED

UNDER SECTIONS 161 and 164 OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE:

(a). Evidentiary Value:-

Section 161 of Cr.P.C. – Statement recorded under S.161 Cr.P.C. shall not be used for any purpose

except to contradict a witness in the manner prescribed in the proviso to Section 162 (1) – Further the First

Information Report is not a substantial piece of evidence – Baldev Singh vs. State of Punjab (1990 (4)

SCC 692 = AIR 1991 SC 31).

In Rajendra singh vs. State of U.P – (2007) 7 SCC 378 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that,

“A statement under Section 161 CrPC is not a substantive piece of evidence. In view of the

provision to Section 162 (1) CrPC, the said statement can be used only for the limited purpose of

contradicting the maker thereof in the manner laid down in the said proviso. Therefore, the High

Court committed a manifest error of law in relying upon wholly inadmissible evidence in recording

a finding that Respondent 2 could not have been present at the scene of commission of the

crime.”

Section 164 Cr.P.C. Statement – It can be used for corroboration or contradiction. In Sunil Kumar

and others vs. State of M.P. reported in AIR 1997 SC 940 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that,

“20. .... This conclusion of ours, however, does not in any way affect the merits of the

prosecution case for we find that immediately after PW 1 was taken to the hospital his statement

was recorded as a dying declaration which, consequent upon survival, is to be treated only as a

statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC and can be used for corroboration or contradiction.

....”

(b). Confrontation of Statement:-

Sections 161 and 162 of Criminal Procedure Code – The Witness not confronted with the statement

– The Court cannot subsequently use the statement even for drawing any adverse impression against the

witness – Dandu Lakshmi Reddi vs. State of A.P. (AIR 1999 SC 3255).

(c). Signing of Statement:-

Sections 161 and 162 – Statement of witness – If thumb impression or signature obtained – Such

statements are unreliable – Gurnam Kaur vs. Bakshish Singh and others – AIR 1981 SC 631.

Section 161 – Signing of statement – It merely puts the Court on caution and may necessitate in

depth scrutiny of the evidence, but the evidence on this account cannot be rejected outright – State of U.P

vs. M.K. Anthony – AIR 1985 SC 48.

ALL ABOUT FIR.


WHAT IS MEANT BY  FIRST INFORMATION REPORT ?




FIR is not an encyclopedia. It is only to set the law in motion. It need not elaborate but should

contain necessary allegations to constitute cognizable offences.

1) ROTASH Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [(2006) 12 SCC 64]

HEAD NOTE: Sections 154 and 161 Cr.P.C. - First Information Report – Discrepancy – Effect – Name

of the appellant not disclosed in FIR by PW 1 – However, he categorically named by PWs 1 and 6 (mother

of the deceased and the accused, as well as an injured witness) in their statements before the police and

specific overt act attributed to him by PW 1 before the court – Held, the FIR is not an encyclopaedia of the

entire case and need not contain all the details – Though the importance of naming an accused in FIR

cannot be ignored, but in the instant case he had been named at the earliest possible opportunity –

Question as to whether a person was implicated by way of an afterthought or not must be judged having

regard to the entire factual scenario obtaining in the case – However, non-naming of the appellant by PW 1

is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of PW 6 who was a crucial witness.

(Paras 14, 21, 22 and 23)

(a). Evidentiary Value:

Section 154, Cr.P.C – Use of FIR - FIR is not a substantial piece of evidence - It can only be used

for corroborating or contradicting its maker – It cannot be used to corroborate or contradict other witnesses

–Baldev Singh vs. State of Punjab – (1990) 4 SCC 692 ; State of Gujarat vs. Anirudhsing – (1997) 6

SCC 514.

Section 154, Cr.P.C. – FIR – Evidentiary value – Corroboration of its maker is permissible – But the

first information report cannot be used as substantive evidence or corroborating a statement of third party –

State of M.P. vs. Surbhan – AIR 1996 SC 3345.

(b). Delay in FIR:

Delay in FIR – The inordinate and unexplained delay in despatching the first information report to the

Magistrate – The difference in the account given by the prosecution witnesses and appearing from the first

information report of the occurrence – the absence of any statement in the first information report as to the

injuries received by some of the accused, and the non-examination of material witnesses – Conviction

cannot be sustained – Ishwar Singh vs. State of U.P – AIR 1976 SC 2423.

The Hon’ble Apex Court in Meharaj Singh (L/Nk.) V. State of U.P. (1994 (5) SCC 188) has held

that,

”12. FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of

evidence for the purpose of appreciating the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon

prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstance in which

the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them,

4

the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR

often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of delay, the FIR

not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger also creeps in of the introduction of a

coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determine whether the FIR was lodged at the

time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One

of the checks is the receipt of the copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the

local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late it can give rise to an inference that

the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course the

prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in despatching or receipt of the copy of

the FIR by the local Magistrate. …. The second external check equally important is the sending of

the copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though

the inquest report, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to

lend credence to the prosecution case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded

during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of

the fact that the prosecution story was still in embryo and had not been given any shape and that

the FIR came to be recorded later on after due deliberations and consultations and was then antetimed

to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. ….”

The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of H.P. V. Gian Chand (2001) 6 SCC 71 has held that,

“12. Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution

case and discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in lodging the first information report.

Delay has the effect of putting the court in its guard to search if any explanation has been offered for

the delay, and if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily

explain the delay and there is a possibility of embellishment in the prosecution version on account of

such delay, the delay would be fatal to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the

satisfaction of the court, the delay cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and discarding the

entire prosecution case.”

The Hon’ble Apex Court in Dilawar Singh V. State of Delhi reported in 2007 (12) SCC 641

has held that,

“9. In criminal trial one of the cardinal principles for the Court is to look for plausible explanation

for the delay in lodging the report. Delay sometimes affords opportunity to the complainant to

make deliberation upon the complaint and to make embellishment or even make fabrications.

Delay defeats the chance of the unsoiled and untarnished version of the case to be presented

before the court at the earliest instance. That is why if there is delay in either coming before the

police or before the court, the courts always view the allegations with suspicion and look for

satisfactory explanation. If no such satisfaction is formed, the delay is treated as fatal to the

prosecution case.”

Delay in lodging first information report cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting a

case Silak Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 2007 SC 2739. To the same effect there is another case

Gourishankara Swamigala v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2008 SC 2349.

5

(c). Delay to Magistrate Court:–

No proper explanation – Fatal to the prosecution case – State of Rajasthan V. Sheo Singh (AIR

2003 SC 1783). Similar view was taken earlier in Awadesh V. State of M.P. (AIR 1988 SC 1158) and in

State of Rajasthan V. Teja Singh (2001 SCC (Cri) 439).

(d). Nature of FIR:-

General diary containing – General diary containing a noting of a report regarding cognizable

offence, cannot be treated as FIR - Telephonic information to investigating officer – Such information not in

nature of FIR – Animireddy Venkata Ramana vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh -

(2008) 5 SCC 368.

6

ADVERSE POSSESSION AS EXPLAINED BY HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 ADVERSE POSSESSION AS EXPLAINED BY HON'BLE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA:-


In Annasaheb vs B.B.Patil AIR 1995 SC 895 Hon'ble court

held that-

“Adverse possession means a hostile possession which is expressly

or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner. Under Article 65 of the

Limitation Act, burden is on the defendants to prove affirmatively. A person

who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and

unequivocal evidence i.e. possession was hostile to the real owner and

amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. In deciding whether

the acts, alleged by a person, constitute adverse possession, regard must

be had to the animus of the person doing those acts which must be

ascertained from the facts and circumstances of each case. The person

who bases his title on adverse possession, therefore, must show by clear

and unequivocal evidence i.e. possession was hostile to the real owner

and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed.”

In Karnataka Board of Wakf Vs Govt. of India (2004)10

SCC 779 Hon’ble court in para 11 of the judgment held that-

“A person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) On

what date he came into possession, (b) What was the nature of his

possession, (c) Whether the factum of possession was known to the other

party, (d) How long his possession has continued, and (e) His possession

was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no

equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true

owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to

establish his adverse possession.”

In T. Anjanappa & others Vs Somalingappa & another

(2006)7 SCC 570 Hon’ble court held that -

“It is well recognized proposition in law that mere possession

however long does not necessarily means that it is adverse to the true

owner. Adverse possession really means the hostile possession which is

46 Uttarakhand Judicial & Legal Review

expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner and in order to

constitute adverse possession the possession proved must be adequate in

continuity, in publicity and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the

true owner. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse

possession are that such possession in denial of the true owners title must

be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile

enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the

property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the

adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the formers hostile

action. The High Court has erred in holding that even if the defendants

claim adverse possession, they do not have to prove who is the true owner

and even if they had believed that the Government was the true owner

and not the plaintiffs, the same was inconsequential. Obviously, the

requirements of proving adverse possession have not been established. If

the defendants are not sure who is the true owner the question of their

being in hostile possession and the question of denying title of the true

owner do not arise. Above being the position the High Courts judgment is

clearly unsustainable.”

In Chatti Konati Rao and other’s vs Palle Venkata Subba

Rao (2010) 14 SCC 316 Hon’ble court in para 14 of the judgment held

that-

“In view of the several authorities of this court, few whereof

have been referred above, what can safely be said is that were possession

however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true

owner. It means hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial

of the title of the true owner and in order to constitute adverse possession

the possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent so

as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The possession must be

open and hostile enough so that it is known by the parties interested in the

property. The plaintiff is bound to prove his title as also possession within

twelve years and once the plaintiff proves his title, the burden shifts on

the defendant to establish that he has perfected his title by adverse

possession. Claim by adverse possession has two basic elements i.e. the

possession of the defendant should be adverse to the plaintiff and the

defendant must continue to remain in possession for a period of twelve

years thereafter.”

Adverse Possession : A Critique 47

What is adverse possession, on whom the burden of proof lie, the

approach of the Hon’ble court towards such plea, etc have been the subject

matter of decision in a large number of cases such as Ejas Ali vs. Special

Manager, Coart of wards Balrampur Estate AIR 1935 PC 53, S.M.

Karim vs. Bibi Sakina AIR 1964 SC 1254, Parsinni vs. Sukhi (1993)

4 SCC 375, Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil vs Balwant (1995) 2 SCC

543, Vidya Devi vs. Prem Prakash (1995) 4 SCC 496, D. N.

Venkatarayappa vs. State of Karnataka (1997) 7 SCC 567, Mahesh

Chand Sharme vs. Raj Kumari Sharma (1996) 8 SCC 128,

M.D.Mohammad Ali (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Jagdish Kalita & other’s

(2004) SCC 271, Saroop Singh vs. Banto & other’s (2005) 8 SCC

330, Smt. Kalawati (Since deceased) vs. Girish Sharma (Since

deceased) 2007 UAD 859, Nagar Palika Parishad Jaspur Distt.

Udham Singh Nagar through its executive officer vs Sooraj Singh

and 2 other’s 2007 (2) UC 849, P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy vs.

Revamma AIR 2007 SC 1753 & Annakili vs. Vedanayagam and

other’s AIR 2008 SC 346.

Adverse possession as a shield/defence:- It is very much clear that

claim of ownership by adverse possession can be made only by way of

defence when arrayed as defendant in proceedings against him. Even if

the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration

to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership.

No declaration can be sought by a plaintiff with regard to his ownership

on the basis of an adverse possession.

In Bhim Singh and others Vs Zile Singh & others, AIR

2006 PH 195 Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in para 11 of

the judgment held that:-

“11. Under Article 64 of the Limitation Act, as suit for possession

of immovable property by a plaintiff, who while in possession of

the property had been dispossessed from such possession, when

such suit is based on previous possession and not based on title,

can be filed within 12 years from the date of dispossession.

Under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, a suit for possession of

immovable property or any interest therein, based on title, can

be field by a person claiming title within 12 years. The limitation

under this Article commences from the date when the possession

48 Uttarakhand Judicial & Legal Review

of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. In these

circumstances, it is apparent that to contest a suit for possession,

filed by a person on the basis of his title, a plea of adverse

possession can be taken by a defendant who is in hostile,

continuous and open possession, to the knowledge of the true

owner, if such a person has remained in possession for a period

of 12 years. It, thus, naturally has to be inferred that plea

of adverse possession is a defense available only to a

defendant. This conclusion of mine is further strengthened from

the language used in Article 65, wherein, in column 3 it has

been specifically mentioned “when the possession of the

defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.” Thus, a perusal of

the aforesaid Article 65 shows that the plea is available only to

a defendant against a plaintiff. In these circumstances, natural

inference must follow that when such a plea of adverse

possession is only available to a defendant, then no declaration

can be sought by a plaintiff with regard to his ownership on the

basis of an adverse possession.”

Recently Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Gurdwara Sahib

Vs Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala and another, (2014) 1 SCC 669

has held that no declaration can be sought by a plaintiff with regard to his

ownership on the basis of an adverse possession. The relevant paragraphs

of the judgment are reproduced as under:

“8. There cannot be any quarrel to this extent that the judgments

of the courts, below are correct and without any blemish. Even

if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot

seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession

has matured into ownership. Only if proceedings are filed against

the appellant and the appellant is arrayed as defendant that it

can use this adverse possession as a shield/defense.

10. As the appellant is in possession of the suit property since

13-4-1952 and has been granted the decree of injunction, it

obviously means that the possession of the appellant cannot be

disturbed except by due process of law. We make it clear that

though the suit of the appellant seeking relief of declaration has

been dismissed, in case of respondents file suit for possession

Adverse Possession : A Critique 49

and/or ejectment of the appellant, it would be open to the appellant

to plead in defence that the appellant had become the owner of

property by adverse possession. Needless to mention at this stage,

the appellant shall also be at liberty to plead that findings of

issue 1 to the effect that the appellant is in possession of adverse

possession since 13-4-1952 operates as res judicata. Subject to

this clarification, the appeal is dismissed.”

It is pertinent to mention hear that a new approach in defining the

subject was made by the Hon’ble Apex court in the case of State of

Haryana vs. Mukesh Kumar and Other's (2011) 10 SCC 404. The

relevant paragraphs of the judgment are reproduced as under:

“1&2. People are often astonished to learn that a trespasser

may take the title of a building or land from the true owner in

certain conditions and such theft is even authorised by law. The

theory of adverse possession is also perceived by the general

public as a dishonest way to obtain title to property. Property

right advocates argue that mistakes by landowners or negligence

on their part should never transfer their property rights to a

wrongdoer, who never paid valuable consideration for such an

interest. The Government itself may acquire land by adverse

possession. Fairness dictates and commands that if the

Government can acquire title to private land through adverse

possession, it should be able to lose title under the same

circumstances.

39. We inherited this law of adverse possession from the British.

Parliament may consider abolishing the law of adverse possession

or at least amending and making substantial changes in the law

in the larger public interest. The government instrumentalitiesincluding

the police-in the instant case have attempted to possess

land adversely. This, in our opinion, is a testament to the absurdity

of the law and a black mark upon the justice system's legitimacy.

The Government should protect the property of a citizen-not

steal it. And yet, as the law currently stands, they may do just

that. If this law is to be retained, according to the wisdom of

Parliament, then at least the law must require those who

adversely possess land to compensate the title owners according

50 Uttarakhand Judicial & Legal Review

to the prevalent market rate of the land or property in question.

This alternative would provide some semblance of justice to those

who have done nothing other than sitting on their rights for the

statutory period, while allowing the adverse possessor to remain

on property. While it may be indefensible to require all adverse

possessors- some of whom may be poor- to pay market rates

for the land they possess, perhaps some lesser amount would

be realistic in most of the cases. Parliament may either fix a set

range of rates or to leave it to the judiciary with the option of

choosing from within a set range of rates so as to tailor the

compensation to the equities of a given case.

40. Parliament must seriously consider at least to abolish "bad

faith" adverse possession i.e. adverse possession achieved through

intentional trespassing, actually believing it to be their own could

receive title through adverse possession, sends a wrong signal

to the society at large. Such a change would ensure that only

those who had established attachments to the land through honest

means would be entitled to legal relief.

41. In case, Parliament decides to retain the law of adverse

possession, Parliament might simply require the adverse

possession claimants to possess the property in question for a

period of 30 to 50 years, rather than a mere 12. Such an extension

would help to ensure that the successful claimants have lived on

the land for generations, and are therefore less likely to be

individually culpable for the trespass (although their forebears

might). A longer statutory period would also decrease the

frequency of adverse possession suits and ensure that only those

claimants most intimately connected with the land acquire it,

while only the most passive and unprotective owners lose title.



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